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    ON ARTICLE 90 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN 
                      BY KIKUO ISHIDA 
                         Lecturer, Osaka University 
I 
   In Article 90 of the Civil Code,)is regulated that 
       A juristic act which has for its object suchmatters as are contrary 
   to public order or good morals is null and void. 
   Before entering into the examination of thisarticle let me compare it with 
a few of European prototypes.') Their interpretations must be referred, too. 
   In Roman law (corpus juris civilis), was given in principle the following 
regulation, though not applied to all juuristic acts.3) 
       ... ornnia, quae contra bonos moresvel in stipulatione deducuntur, 
    nullius momenti sunt. (c. 4. Cod. 8. 3.) 
   According to the theory of continental common law (gemeines Recht), 
1) The Civil Code with capital letters denotes that of Japan unless otherwise stated. 
2) Comparative andhistorical study must play an important part in the interpretation of the 
law especially in case of Japanese one. 
3) It is chiefly because corpus juris civilis is the action system and was not yet formed into a 
systematic construction of the abstruct regulation as the presentday l w.* Of this problem 
Boehmer says justly in his Grundlagen d r Bargerlichen R chtsordnxng (Tiibingen, 1951) ; "Die 
romischen Juristen verschmahen es racist bewuit, die juristichen Figuren, mit dennen sie arbeiten, 
durch analystische Zerlegung in ihre Komponenten (Elemente, Bestandteile) diagnostisch zu 
definieren. Ebensowenig haben sie das Bediirfnis, ihre Fall6sungen durch Reduktion auf generellere 
Formeln aus logischen Oberbegriffen abzuleiten (deduktive M thode) and mit gemeineren Erw ate-
ungen zu begrunden, als der konkrete Fall es gerade verlangt ... ; es (Prinzip) abstraut scharf 
auszusprechen, im Grunde darzulegen, halten sie einerseits nicht fur n6tig, sind aber andererseits 
auch nicht fahig dazu.,, (SS. 60-61) Referring to the above, you will see that Aemilius Pomponius' 
following opinion on bonus mos is sufficiently convincing : " quae facta laedunt pietaem existimati-
onem verecundiam nostram et,ut generaliter dilerim, contra bonos mores fiunt, nec facere nos posse 
credendum est." (1. 15. Dig. 28. 7.) 
* It is not until Pandects-jurisprudence broughtforth the systematic treatment of he law that 
the civil aw took the present form as systematized with every provision. (Cf. Eugen Ehrlich, Grund-
legung der Soziologie des Rechts, Miinchen and Leipzig, 1913, SS. 257 ff.)
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       Nichtig sind die Willenserklarungen, diesichdurch ihren Inhalt 
   in Widerspruch setzen mit den Vorschriften des Sittengesetzes. 
      Nichtig sind im Zweifel Rechtsgeshaftedi durch ihrem Inhalt 
   gegen ein gesetzliches Verbot versto(3en. 
       Nichtig sind Rechtsgeschafte, die ein Rechstsverhastniss schaffen 
   wollen, welches die Rechtsordnung icht anerkennt.4> 
(The legall order (Rechtsordnung) heremeant is no other than the order given 
by the common law, that is, the private law.) This principle, primarily adopted 
to the chapter on the juristic act in the general provision, became to be applied 
to every juristic act without exception. Prussian ational law (A. L. R.)') and 
code civil6) were on this principle. 
   The first draft of the German civil code, in Article 106, taking the example 
of the aforesaid French code civil, primarily regulated that juristic act whose 
content is against good morals (gute Sitte) or the public order (of}entlich Ordnung) 
was invalid.7) The First Committee supported this plan considering the fact that 
the content of a juristic act can be contrary not only to the moral interest but 
also to the general interest of the commonwealth, but the breach of the latter 
is not always regarded in the same light as that of the former. In this way 
both the idea of public order and that of good morals were acknowledged in 
the first draft. Against his the Second Committee maintained that the idea of 
offentliche Ordnung is to be excluded from the civil code, because the limit of its 
meaning is not definite. It was for this reason that the idea of public order 
was excluded from the present Article 138, which regulates only about good 
4) Bernhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, Bd. I, Berlin, 1900, SS. 358-60. 
5) According to Heinrich Dernburg's opinion, " DalI der Staat unsittlichen unddem Gemeinwohl 
schadlichen G schaften di  Rechtshulfe weigert, isteine unbedingte Anforderung a  eine verniinftige 
Rechtsordnung. Wasjedoch im Einzelnen als schadlich und unsittich gilt bestimmt sich versehe, 
den nach den jeweiligen wirtschaftlichen Bed irfnissen der Volker und Zeiten. Der Znstand des 
heutigen preussischen Rechtes weicht indieser Hinsicht von dem landrechtlichen in vielen Bezieh-
ungen ab, wie dieser wiederum keineswegs mit den romischen Auffassung iibereinstimmt." (Lehrbuch 
des preussischen Privatrechts, Bd. 1, 4 Aufl., 1884, S.171.) 
6) Art. 6: On ne pent deroger, par des conventions particulieres, aux loi qui interessent l'ordre 
public et bonnes moeures. 
   Art. 1133:Lacause est illicite, quand elle est prohibee par la loi, quand elle st contraire aux 
bonnes moeures on a l'ordre public. 
7) Cf. J, V. Staudingers Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch und dem Einfuhrungsgesetze, 
Bd.. J, Allgemeiner T d, erlautert von Dr. Theodor Lowenfeld u. Dr. Erwin Riezler. 7/8 Aufl., 
Miinchen u, Berlin 1912, SS. 530.
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         morals, as " Ein Rechtsgeschaft das gegen die gute Sitten versto(9t, ist nichtig." 
       C§ 138, BGB.) 
            Settingaside the case of German civil code, let me pay attention to what 
         is meant by l'ordre publics) in code civil, because the object of the present thesisis
         partly to give a clue to this problem. As for the interpretation of Article 6,
         it is commonly accepted9) that l'ordre public denotes the order necessary for the 
         commonwealth, at is, a definite system indispensable for the administrative 
         activity. Even the laws other than the private one are taken as connected with 
         l'ordre public, such laws as the criminal law and its procedure and the public 
        law by which are regulated the personal duty to the State, the authorityof the 
        public official, and the judical system. The loi in Article 1133, if l'ordre publicin
        the same article is to be interpreted in the same light as that in Article 6, would 
        be defined as the statute, which disapprove expressedly the validity of the juristic 
         act from the standpoint of the private law. 
                             II 
            Of the ` public order or good morals'provided in Article 90 of the Civil 
         Code, it has been taken for granted that the one denotes the general benefit o
         the commonwealth, and the other, the common moral sense of the general public, 
        and the social approprieteness of act is to be brought forth from the conbination
         of both of them. Of this problem let me refer to the opinions of 'Dr. Suekawa 
         and Mr. Wagatsuma, the two greatest living authorities in that line of Japan. 
         In his Civil Law,') vol. 1, Dr. Suekawa explicitly says ; 
                The `public order' denotes the public order systematized for the 
             commonwealth, and `good morals' signify the morals commonly acceptedby 
            the people's _public. However, no definite border line is to be drawn between 
            these two. Here suffice it to say that either of them forms the fundamental 
            idea of the law. (p. 69) 
         Mr. Wagatsuma, in his Lectures on the Civil Lawn) (revised edition), interprets 
         these two ideas saying, 
           8) Of the provisionf Article 6 and 1133 ofcode civil, confer on the foot-note 6 in the present section. 
           9) As an exampls, confer on Colin et Capitant, Cours elementaire de Droit Civil Frangais, tome 
            I, 4ed., Paris, 1923, pp. 62-4. 
         1) Minpo (The CivilLaw), Vol. 1, Tokyo, 1947. 
          2) Minpo Kogi I. (Lectures on the Civil Law),Vol. I, Tokyo, 1951.
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       The 'public order' denotes the general benefito the commonwealth, 
    and 'good morals,' the common moral sense in the public in general. You 
    will see however that to keep `good morals' holds good at once to the 
   general benefit, and to be responsible for the general benefit is desirable for 
   maintaining the moral sense of the age. In this sense these two ideas have 
   many things in common and it is not easy to distinguish each other. As 
   stated above, the only difference between these two is that the one aimsto 
   the order of the commonwealth, while the other, the general moral sense. 
   You need not however to make any distinct difference between these two 
   when you have to examine the breach of them, because the Civil Codecan 
   invalidate whatever is against any of the two ideas. Therefore, to be 
   properly understood, letme introduce the idea of social proprietenesswhich 
   covers these two ideas. (pp. 230-1) 
It seems that almost all theories on this problem are based on the above ones. 
   But towards these theories Professor Yunoki asssumes a critical attitude and 
says ;
       With the fact that the general benefit ' to the commonwealth or the 
   social appropriateness of act is creditted by the disciplinary regulation [lex 
   perfecta], it is unfair that the act against he disciplinary regulation should 
   not be regarded as invalid, while the act against he general benefit or the 
   social approprieteness, without his regulation, should be taken for invalid. 
   A man whose juristic act, without he breach of the compulsoryegulation 
   [lex minus perfecta], is taken for invalid, should be invalidated not only 
   because he violates the general benefit o the commonwealth or the social 
   approprieteness, but also because he acts contrary to the public moral sense, 
   a practical principle of people's living. Otherwise, the theory would be 
   self-contradictory 3) 
He makes a further remark on this problem with much originality, saying, 
       The phrase `public order or good morals' is nothing butan literary 
   translation of ` bonnes moeurs ou ... l'ordre public' in Article 1133of code 
   civil, and these two ideas [i. e. `public order' and good morals'] are 
   to be combined into. one denotation, that is, an ethical idea commonly 
3) Kaoru Yunoki, Hanrei Minp6 S6ron (An Outliine of the Case Civil Law), Vol. II, Tokyo,", 1950, p.49.
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   accepted. Their purpose is to check any breach of them in the limit of 
   the private law by introducing an ethical rule into the legal idea 4) 
Professor Ari-izumi gives another unique theory. 
    ... in Article 90, two things are mentioned all at once ; the one is about 
   what is forbidden both by the ethical rule (which is to do with personality) 
   and the law proper, that is, about the breach of `good morals ',and the 
   other is about what is to be prevented politically by the commonwealth orr 
   the lawgiver (which is, in this case, has nothing to do with personality,) 
       that is, about the breach of the ` public ooder,' and thesetwo are 
   subject o a legal idea, ` invalidity.' I have thus understood the genuine 
   meaning of Article 90, which regulates the case of the non-fulfilment of
   contract. I think nothing contradictory may be found in such a treatment 
   of these two ideas under a single idea 'invalidity', because to disapprove 
   the right of action on the side of the transgressor f `good morals.' holds 
   good at once to the ` public order,' and therefore to declare it invalidwith 
   reference to the juristic act is little inconsistent with the meaning of this 
   article. Hence it becomes possible to apply such an effect concerning`good 
   morals' to the invalidity theory. In this sense, the disapproval of theright 
   of act may be uniformly understood under a single idea of `invalidity.' 
   The conclusion is that these two ideas co-exist in Article 90.5> 
Not a few questions still remain about Professor Ari-izumi's theory. Setting 
aside whether or not the ethical rule has something to, do with personality, I 
do not think that Article 90 contains in itself something to. do with personality. 
Nor do I agree with such an opinion as acknowledges that `good morals' form 
a part or another aspect of the `  public order.' It is therefore too much to say 
that " to disapprove the right of action on the side of the transgressor of ` good 
morals' holds good at once to the ` public order."' 
   Not only to the theory of Professor Ari-izumi but also to that of Professor 
Yunoki I do not readily give a consent, but here I will leave my criticism 
untouched until the latter part of this thesis and only suffice it to examine the 
relation of the compulsory and disciplinary regulation to the civil law, as 
4) Yunoki, op. cit., pp. 49-50. 
5) T6ru Ari-izumi, " FuhS-gen-in kyisfu (The payment byIllicit Cause) " in HBgaku KyBkai Zat-
tshi (Magazine forthe Jurisprudence Society), Vol. LIII, No, 4.
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suggested by Professor Yunoki. 
   Article 91 of the Civil Code :
      If the parties to a juristic act have declared an intention which 
   differs from any provisions of laws or ordinances which are riotcon-
   cerned with public order, such intention shall prevail. 
The ` provisions of law or ordinances which are not concerned with public 
order' are no other than the voluntary regulation. It may be justly said that 
the Civil Code, in Article 91, affords us with the special effect of the intention 
declared ifferently from such a voluntary regulation. The commonly-accepted 
theory concludes from the counter-interpretation of Article 91, that the 'pro-
visions of law or ordinances' are the compulsory ones and to intent against 
them is to be invalidated. (There is not without such exception as Professor 
Taniguchi's theory, the only one that I know 6) As for my own opinion, I will 
leave it untouched for the time being, because the remaining part of this thesis 
will give an opportunity to state it.) According to the accepted opinion,         
. the compulsory regulation should be distinguished from the dis-
   ciplinary one. The disciplinary regulation, being meant to forbid or to 
   control a fixed act, has nothing to do with the compulsory one whenit 
   treats the merely factual act. But when it has to control transactions, 
   there comes the controversy as to whether, in case of the act against he 
   regulation, the actual offender is to be punished or the effect of theact 
   concerning the private law be disapproved.') 
   Of this problem my opinion must be given here. I interprete the ` public 
order' as the compulsory egulation of the private law, and ` good morals,' as 
the moral of the public in general. These two ideas given in equal terms by 
a co-ordinate conjunction 'or' are, in this case, not to be regarded as the 
same thing. Of course I do not mean that it is errornous to take the ` public 
order' for the general benefit o the commonwealth, but only do I mean that 
each law is to be exercised ifferently according to the difference of its field 
and its object. Let me say more concretely. The law, in a field different 
from its own, should not regulate the object other than its own, and in this 
6) Cf. Tomohei Taniguchi, Fuh6-gen-in Kyzfu no Kenkyu (A Study of Illicit Paymenta) Tokyo, 
1950, p.190. 
7) Wagatsuma, op cit., p. 224.
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sense, the general benefit o the commonwealth must be interpreted ifferently 
according to the difference of the limit of each law, and here must be dealt 
as the compulsory regulation of the Civil Code within the limit of the Civil 
Code permit. Therefore theoretically speaking, to set an limitation to the 
compulsory egulation with such a phrase as 'of the private law' will prove of 
no use, but we can still grant such a limitation referring to the fact that a 
juristic custom is to invalidate, as a matter of course, the act against he 
administrative and criminal law in terms of the private one. Anyway, 
according to my opinion, the Civil Code, Article 91 affords us with an all-
inclusive principle to invalidate both the act against he compulsory regulation 
(of the private law) and that against the so called moral of the public in 
general.") 
   Proceeding in this way with this problem, we have to compare the act which 
is ` contrary to public order' in Article 90 not with the act against both l'ordre public 
in code civile and the bfentliche Ordnung9) in the former German Law, but more 
properly, with the gesetzliche V rbot in Article 134 of German Civil Code and 
the act `  prohibee par la loi ' in the first half of Article 1131 of code civile. Of 
course these European Laws do not restrict he function of the Gesetz or the loi 
within the limit of the civil code or its extra case, and cannot by themselves 
control any validity of the private law whatever punishment or prohibition 
they may regulate. In short questions are resolved only according to whether 
or not a separate regulation can disapprove the validity of the private law. 
Here it is suffice to see that the problem of the compulsory regulation of the 
private law was the matter of controversy either in German or in France as 
well as in Japan. 
   Let me add a few more to make sure of my opinion. There is no plausi-
8) There was a scholar who had held the opinion that "to invalidate th  act which is contrary to 
the ethics is to ignore the difference between the law and ethics, that is, to deviate from the proper 
limit of the law. (Kenjiro Ume, Minpo Yogi (Interpretation of the Civil Code), 1901 p. 90) But 
that he law does not protect the anti-ethical actis another thing from that he law compels the 
ethical goodness. It was he that ignored the difference. The problem has nothing todo with the 
difference between the law and ethics. Nowadays such atheory has been completely disapproved. 
9) At present this phrase is not acknowledged as a judical term of the Civil Code but o be 
against the 'ofentliche Ordnung' is taken for independent of the validity of the private law. Cf. 
Enneccerus-Nipperdey, L hrbuch des Burgerliehen R chts. Bd., 1. 2Abt., Tiibingen, 1955. SS. 812 
ff. ; Colin-Capitan, op cit. ; Lehmann, Allgemeiner T d des Burgerlichen Gesetzbuches, 7 Aufl., 
Berlin 1952. SS. 174 ff.
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ble connection between the theory which says that " to keep `good morals' 
holds good at once to the general benefit, and to be responsible for the general 
benefit is desirable for maintaing the moral sense of the age [and] in this sense 
these two ideas ['the public order' and ` good morals'] have many things in 
common. . ," and the theory which says that to distinguish theoretically the 
one from the other is impossible. Consequently it must not be concluded 
so hastily as that we "need not ... make any distinct difference between these 
two,"10) because it is not always right to conclude that any interpretation 
adoptable to the realities is correct, though whether or not an interpretation is 
theoretically correct may be examined according to whether or not it is to be 
adopted to the social realities. As for the theory of Professor Yunoki who 
completely ignores the `  public order ' as far as Article 90 is concerned, he is 
too haste in his conclusion ignoring the fact that both Article 91 and 92 
hold the idea of the ` public order'. As I presume, Professor Yunoki, in his 
commentary on Article 91, might have ignored the meaning of the ` public 
order"') only to make his theory consistent. Article 91 should be under-
stood more poperly only in terms of the voluntary regulation. It ought to be 
interpreted more straightforwards a I have done without a help of counter-
interpretation.12) 
   My next concern is about such an expression as ` has for its object such 
matter as are contrary to..'..' Here, ` its object' is the content (Inhalt) of the 
juristic act, in other words, the juristic change resulted from that act. It is 
not correct o say that it represents only the payment (Leistung), which must 
be done as the result of the juristic act by the parties. Consequently, whether 
or not the juristic act is against he ` public order' or `good morals' should 
be decided according to the general content of the act itself. 
   The question still remains as to the case in which the motive for the act 
is against `good morals'.'-) When the motive is not declared expressedly or
10) Of these quotations from Mr. Wagatsuma's, see page 18 of this thesis. 
11) As far as Article 91 is concerned, Professor Yunoki holds the commonly accepted opinion, 
which was given by Dr. Kawana and Dr. Hatoyama a decade ahead. In this sense the opinion 
is of long standing. 
12) " The importance of Article 91, " according to Professor Yunoki, " exists rather in its 
invalidating a juristic act, when the content of the act is against the compulsory regulation." (Op. 
cit., pp. 25-6)
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impliedly there remains no room to make a further controversy, but when 
declared opinions is divided. 
   The earlier opinions completely ignored this question saying, 
       Even when the juristic act is against he public order or good morals, 
   the act is not invalidated.14) 
or, 
       Only _ the- content or the matter of the juristic act should be the 
   standard of judgement; I am convinced that to be controlled easilyby 
   the motive sentiment of the parties is against he purpose of this article.'`) 
Recent opinions however, have taken seriously this question and says, 
       Immorality of the, motive, when both parties are conscious of it, 
   should be invalidated.16) 
or 
       The 'motive declared' as the content of the juristic act, is to be taken 
   for the standard of judgment of the anti-sociality of the act.17> 
or 
       Motive is to be a matter of account only when declared by the juristic 
    act itself ... 18) 
   Be the opinions as they are, I still think' it too hasty to conclude that 
the declared thing is the, content.19> Whether or not the motive, in broader 
sense, is the content must be cautiously concluded once it is declared. 
   Another opinion says that 
13) The problem ofthe' act against the 'public order' is beyond question, because it is too 
evident tobe the matter ofcontroversy. 
14) Kenshiro Kawana, Nippon-Minp6 SSron (General Outline of the Civil Code of Japan), 
Tokyo, 1903, p.205. 
15) Hideo Hatoyama, Chashaku Minp6 Zensho (Commentary on the Civil Law), Vol. 2, 1912, 
p. 68. 
   Here it must be apologized that even what' iscalled motive inthe ordinary case should cease 
to be called motive when changed into the condition r the content by the intention declared by
the parties. 
16) Suekawa, op cit., p. 110. 
17) Wagatsuma, op. cit., p. 238. 
18) Yunoki, op. cit., p. 51. -
19) According to this standpoint of view, every motive declared is to be taken easily for the 
content, and every motive, undeclared, not for the content. It is difficult to make a decisive 
distinction between the limit of content and that of motive. The limit of content and motive are 
actually seen overlapping o eanother in a separate case.
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      If it is desirable to regulate the validity of thejuristic act with the 
   purpose of keeping ood morals of general public, the question of motive 
   is justly to be taken seriously as a juristic problem.20) 
   Though it may be justifiable to considerthat Article 90 contains the moral 
sense in itself so long as it invalidates the anti-ethical act, yet to grant the 
motive theory to this Article is theoretically incorrect even when the motive 'is 
declared, considering the fact that the law expressly provides the verbal 
phrase, ' has for its object."') Practically speaking, to do so will lead to evils 
threatening the safety of transaction. 
   We have more questions about Article 90, and not a few problems. till 
remain as to what sort of act is to be judged as practically against he `  public 
order' or `good morals.' It would be a good job to go furthermore into these 
problems referring to numerous precedent cases, which will give us clues to 
solve them, but I will reserve it for another occasion because of the limit of 
paper. 
                       III 
   My purpose in this section is to state what opinion I hold of the law 
proper and make it my conclusion. I expect myself to be the target of adverse 
criticism of what I had said concerning Article 90 in the preceeding sections. 
According to such a criticism, I shall be condemned as too particular about 
wording such as 'or', `public order' and ` has for its object.'') Against the 
criticism I will answer as follows. The text of the law must be supported by 
the social reality and each word in it forms separately an idea with a definite 
content, and it is necessary that a researcher who has to interpret he law 
scientifically should construct the whole system of the civil law after clearify-
ing the content of the idea. Every scholarly research must be done with 
logical consistensy and systematic order. Jurisprudence is not an exception. 
20) Wagatsuma, op. cit., 238. 
21) Confer on the fact that more theories and precedent cases about Article 138 of German 
Civil Code do not consent to invalidate th  act only for the immorality of its motive, even when 
the act itself suggests themotive. 
1) For the Anglo-American lawyer, tobe particular about phraseology and theory would seem of
no use so long as their practical effect ispassable, But on this problem I shall have another chance 
to discuss,
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So long as a theory is confirmable according to the factual happening of life, 
the proof of it may naturally be dependent on the factuality, but to interpret 
the law so as to make the factuality correspond easily to the law is imprudent. 
He who ..interprets he law scientifically has to keep the purely objective 
attitude towards the law and realize himself that he is not ordained as to 
construct the law as he pleases. Such an attitude as I hold is commonly called 
Rechtspositioismus. Against this is expected the following criticism. 
   Rechtspositivismus i  b ilt on an ethical premise i. e. the general will 
(Gemeineswille) of the legislator is always the will for justice and its legality 
(Legalita;) always leads to legitimacy (Legitimitat). Such an ethical premise 
however will betray our trust when legislation is done by many for a wrong 
purpose. Rechispositivismus therefore involves in itself some risk to tie up with 
the political power of the legislator, who bears no ethical responsibility for his 
duty. And, all the worse, this positivism is powerless before the risk.') 
   I must confess that the criticism is all right, but I would, for the time 
being, rely on the good sense of the people, who can distinguish justice from 
injustice, and I hope as an interpretor of the law that people's good sense 
would not betray me. In this sense I think I am nearest to Dr. Hatoyama3) 
who was, and is regarded as an authority of Rechtspositivismus or Begrifs-
Jurisprundenz, and whose opinion is to emphasise the logical consistensy and the 
systematic order for the study of the law. Indeed we stand in serious need of 
renewing `our investigation i to a separate idea and making its systematic 
arrangement after German manner with more references to our native law 
and the reality of our society ' and finally ` initiating reform of our study of 
the law by introducing the jurisprudence of America or France, with reference 
to the achievement of other sciences such as economics and sociology.'4) How 
these opposite manners, that is, the German manner and American and French 
one, may be arranged by the lawyer is another problem, but the limit of paper 
does not allow me to go furthermore into it. Anyway I want to point out in 
this thesis that there is an observable t ndency among the lawyers to ignores 
2) Cf. Franz Wieacker, P ivatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, Berlin, 1952, S.272. Of this problem 
Mr. Mitsukuni Yazaki, in This' " Legality and The Right of Resistance." (Osaka University Law 
Review, No. 4,1957,) gives us an outstanding study. 
3) Hideo Hatayama (T1940) played the most important part among our civil law circle from 
1910s to1920x.
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the logical consistensy with too much attention to the factual phase of society 
and be hasty to make a formal conclusion. I fear lest the interpreter of Article 
90 should be the victim of such a tendency. 
(This thesis is the revision of the paper read in October, 1957 at the bi-annual 
meeting of Osaka University Law Society.)
4) Cf. Wagatsuma's peech at the symposium on 'The Jurisprudence of Japan' held by Shin 
Nippon Hy6ronsha Co. The record of the symposium was published by. the same company in 
1950 titled The Jurisprudence of Japan, its prospect and retrospect. Wagatsuma's peech on this 
problem is in page 51.
